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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ONEL J. BARNETT and
EVELYN I. BARNETT,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

STATE AUTOMOBILE &
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No.
12264

and
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE
AGENCY, and A-1 AGENCIES
DIVERSIFIED,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATE1\1ENT
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
1
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STATEl\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs on a fire insurance policy issued by Defendant for a fire loss which
occurred in Plaintiffs' home.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs received judgment based on a jury verdict against Defendants, State Automobile & Casualty
Underwriters and Diversified Insurance Agency, in the
amount of $23,484.04. Defendant A-1 Agencies Diversified received a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the judgment of the Trial
Court affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since Plaintiffs are entitled to have the facts reviewed in a light most favorable to them and since Defendant's brief fails to so review the facts, we deem it
necessary to restate them.
This action arose from a fire loss in Plaintiffs' home
at Vernal, Utah on October 19, 1967. Plaintiffs filed suit
against State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, the
2
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insurer, and Diversified Insurance Agency and A-1
Agencies Diversified, the agents, claiming as to the insurer, liability on a fire insurance policy, and as to the
agents, liability for negligence and breach of contract.
(R. 58-62)

The policy in question was issued and countersigned by Diversified. The insurer was Guarantee Security Insurance Co. Later, the policy was assumed by
Defendant State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters.
The policy period was from October 1, 1964 to October
1, 1967. The fire occurred on October 19, 1967, some 19
days after the alleged expiration of the policy. The
morning following the fire, Plaintiff, Onel J. Barnett,
notified Diversified of the fire by telephone and requested them to send an adjuster. ( R. 182) . Not hearing from
Diversified for three or four days, Barnett again called
and was informed that his insurance had expired. Plaintiffs mailed a check pre-dated to October 1, 1967, as payment on the policy. (R. 217) The check was returned.
Plaintiffs expected to receive a notice of the expiration of the fire insurance policy and a bill for the renewal
premium. They received no notice of any kind and no
bill. ( R. 183)
Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant insurance company is based on a course of dealing over a period of approximately 18 years. It was adopted by Diversified and
State Auto. The course of dealing consisted of notification of expiration and billing for renewal of fire insurance policies.
3
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One Noble Kimball procured fire insurance policies
for Plaintiffs for approximately 18 years. On every occasion when a policy was about to expire, Kimball would
notify Plaintiffs either by mail or in person and then renew their policy and bill them for the premium. ( R. 170)
On one occasion when Kimball had failed to see Plaintiffs and was planning to be out of the state, he paid the
premium himself and billed Plaintiffs for it. This concerned a fire policy with the Pearl Assurance Co. with a
term from July 5, 1961, to July 5, 1964. (Ex. 2P) During these years, Plaintiffs relied entirely on this course
of dealing in order to keep themselves continually insured. (R. 169-173)
When the Pearl Assurance Co. policy was about to
expire, Kimball brought Richard Salisbury, an officer
in Diversified Insurance Agency, to see Barnett. He introduced Salisbury to Barnett and informed Barnett
that for reasons of health, he was retiring and that Salisbury would take his place and handle his insurance exactly as it had been handled in the past. Salisbury agreed
that he would so perform and then proceeded to obtain
the policy in question for the Barnetts. A letter dated
November 2, 1964, from Diversified by Salisbury confirmed this arrangement. (Ex. 3P) On being questioned
in detail concerning the conversation with Kimball and
Salisbury, on cross-examination, Plaintiff, Onel J. Barnett, testified as follows: (R. 189, 190)
"Q. In other words did he ask you specifically?
You didn't tell .Mr. Salisbury that you want-

4
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ed notice of a certain number of days before
a policy expired did you?
A. I told him I wanted it handled just like it
had been handled before. We agreed on it.
Q. And you didn't tell him at that time how
Mr. Kimball had been handling it, did you?

A. He said he knew.
Q. But you didn't tell him how Mr. Kimball
had been handling the insurance?

A. Yes, I believe I did.
Q. And as far as that is concerned specifically
he didn't promise or say he would send you a
notice or telephone call and tell you about an
expiration date did he?

A. He promised that he would, to the nearest
of his ability, he would continue as had been
carried on."
and further (R. 191)
"Q. And it's also true that you didn't directly call
anybody in the Gurantee Security Insurance
Co. and State Auto and ask that they renew
the policy either?

A. I always paid by statement and notice, I
didn't call nobody, I answered their letters
with a check."
Following the issuance of the policy, Diversified
continued to service it. On July 19, 1966, Diversified issued a personal articles floater which added a camera to
the coverage. (Ex. 13P) On the assumption endorsement attached to the policy in question (Ex. IP), where-

5
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by as of February 28, 1966, State Auto assumed the
policy, the name of Diversified Insurance Agency was
typed at the top. On the change and attaching clause endorsement dated June 19, 1966, stating that the policy is
reinstated, this document was issued and signed by Diversified Insurance Agency. (Ex. 14P) Also during
the course of the policy in question, Plaintiffs submitted
a glass claim which was handled by Diversified (R. 199)
Barnett had always relied on Kimball to send him a
bill so that he would know how much to pay for the insurance coverage. (R. 203) Barnett intended to renew
his policy at such time as it expired and would have paid
a bill had it been sent to him. (R. 184)
William H. Slaugh, an insurance agent in the Vernal area for approximately 19 years testified that he is
acquainted with a custom and practice which is uniform
in this area pertaining to agents who issue policies. He
testified that the custom and practice is that the agent
sends out bills ahead of time and where necessary issues
the policies 15 to 30 days ahead of the expiration date.
If the insured hasn't paid it by the time the policy expires, they notify their insured and give him an opportunity to reinstate the policy. (R. 247)
On Cross-examination, Slaugh testified (R. 249):
"Q. But there is no obligation on the part of the

company to renew any policy if he doesn't
want it on the expiration date, is there? They
can turn it down?

A. There is-I don't know whether it's a set

6
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rule or a general rule but they are notified
30 days ahead of time, and especially if there
is a mortgage on the property."
and again at R. 251:
"Q. Suppose an agent in Salt Lake has a contract and suppose the distance is such from
here to Vernal and it's difficult to inspect
and there is no other insurance out there that
this agent has, would it be logical for him to
just let the policy run out if he didn't want to
have any more business out there?

A. It wouldn't be logical and it wouldn't be
ethical to just run it out.
Q. It wouldn't be ethical? Why wouldn't it be
ethical?

A. I just don't do business that way, I would
pay the premiums, and I just don't drop
them, just not even notify them that there
is nothing taking place."
Mr. Ellwood Johnson, the manager of defendant's
Denver branch office testified that defendant cancelled
the agency of Diversified on November 28, 1964. The
evidence showed, however, that on June 19, 1966 Diversified signed the change and attaching clause endorsement
as defendant's agent. (Ex. 14P) Also on July 12, 1966,
Diversified was shown on the Personal Articles Floater
as defendant's agent. (Ex. 13P) Defendant did not explain this inconsistency. (R. 279) Johnson further admitted that State Auto gave no notice of this cancellation to the Plaintiffs. (R. 279)
7
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POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT
AND JUDGMENT.
The evidence amply supports the verdict rendered
by the jury. The jury was properly instructed on the law
and, therefore, the verdict and judgment should be affirmed.
A. DIVERSIFIED WAS THE AGENT OF
STATE AUTO ON OCTOBER l, 1967.
I. .A.s to Plaintiffs, State .A. uto cannot terminate the
agency without giving notice.

Clearly, pursuant to the statutes and case law, Diversified was the agent of State Auto at all times in issue. 31-17-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines "agent"
as follows:
"'Agent' means any person authorized by an insurer and on its behalf to solicit applicatJons for
insurance, to effectuate and counter-sign insurance contracts, except as to life or disability insurances, and to collect premiums on insurances
so applied for or effectuated. * * *"
The evidence in this case was undisputed that Diversified fell within that definition. Also, according to
the holding in the case of Farrington v. Granite State
Fire Insurance Co. of Portsmouth, et al. (1951) 120
Utah 109, 232 P 2d 754, Diversified was clearly the
agent of State Auto.

8
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The trial Court correctly instructed the jury in Instruction No. 13 (R. 94) that Diversified was the legal
agent of the insurer in whose name the policy in question
was issued as of October 1, 1964. The Court further instructed in the same instruction, that such an agency once
established is "presumed under the law to continue until
parties insured by such agent have been notified of the
termination of such agency, and such agent may bind
the company by his further acts until notice of the revocation of the agent's authority by the insurer is brought
to the attention of persons who have dealt with that
agent." The latter part of the instruction just discussed,
is clearly in line with the general authority on this subj act as stated at 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, par. 154, at
p. 210:
"'Vhere an insurer terminates an agency, the revocation is effective as to all third persons having
notice or knowledge of such revocation, and the
agent cannot thereafter bind the insurer with respect to such third persons by purporting to act
as agent. It is the duty of an insurance company
to notify insured persons who have dealt with
their agent as the representative of the company
of the termination of his authority. If it fails to
do so, it is bound by his acts if such a person continues to deal with him as the representative of
the company, in ignorance of the termination of
the agency. This rule is based on the general principle that the acts of an age.nt ~ithin the app~~ent
scope of his authority are bmdmg on the prmc1pal
as against one who had formerly dealt with him
through the agent and who had no notice of the
revocation."

9
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The evidence was undisputed that Defendant did
not notify Plaintiffs of the claimed termination of the
agency of Diversified. Defendant's manager, Johnson,
testified : ( R. 279)
"Q. But you didn't tell these people that Diversified was not your agent any more, did you?

. "
A . N o, Sll'.

B. DIVERSIFIED ADOPTED THE
COURSE OF DEALING EX I S T IN G BETWEEN NOBLE KIMBALL AND PLAINTIFFS.
The evidence established a course of dealing of some
18 years between Plaintiffs and Noble Kimball. The
course of dealing established the practice of notification
of expiration of fire insurance policies and automatic renewal. Plaintiffs came to rely on this course of dealing
and merely waited for the notification and the bill before
paying the premium. The evidence showed that on one
occasion when Noble Kimball had been unable to contact Plaintiffs, he paid the premium himself and sent a
bill for reimbursement. The evidence further showed
that when Kimball turned over the business to Diversified, he took Richard Salisbury with him and introduced
him to Plaintiffs. Salisbury agreed that he would handle
the business just as it had been handled in the past. On
cross-examination, it was brought out that the matter of
notification had been specifically discussed and that Salisbury was told of the practice between Kimball and
10
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Plaintiffs and agreed that he would continue it. Accordingly, Diversified adopted this course of dealing.
C. STATE AUTO ACCEPTED THE COVERAGE AND BECAME HOUND BY THE
KNOWLEDGE AND ADOPTION OF THE
COURSE OF DEALING BY DIVERSIFIED.
When State Auto accepted the coverage, it adopted
the course of dealing. The Farrington case is clear authority for this proposition. The Court held that when
the insurance company accepted the application and issued the policy, it was charged with the knowledge acquired by the agent in the course of taking the application and forwarding it to the company. The Court states
at p. 115:
"It seems quite inconsistent for them to accept
the advantages of everything he did for their
benefit and yet insist that they are not responsible for the knowledge he acquired about the
building within the necessary and ordinary scope
of his duties in handling the transaction. From the
facts stated, he was their agent and they are
charged with his knowledge. It certainly would
be casting an unreasonable burden upon a lay
person to require him to make inquiry beyo.nd the
authority of Mr. Bowman under the circumstances which were present here."

In that case, the Court, under a similar type of
agency transaction, held that the company was charged
with the knowledge of the agent concerning the insured
building and its condition before issuing the policies.

11
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Just as in that case, Diversified in this case took the application, forwarded it to State Auto, collected the premiums, countersigned the policy, and placed its sticker
thereon. Under such a situation, according to the authority of the Farrington case, the knowledge of Diversified
concerning the course of dealing was imputed to State
Auto, and by issuing the policy, State Auto adopted the
course of dealing to notify Plaintiffs of the expiration
of the policy and to properly renew it.
The Farrington case cites with approval the case of
New Brunswick Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols (1923)
210 Ala. 63, 97 So. 82. In that case, Plaintiff applied for
a fire insurance policy to an agent who represented Hartford Insurance Company and informed the agent of the
nature of his interest in the land involved. He had a lease
with an option to purchase, the option not having been
exercised. The agent issued the policy and collected the
premium. Thereafter, Hartford cancelled the policy and
returned the premium. This agent then went to an agent
of the Defendant and placed the policy with him. The
Defendant insurance company issued the policy to its
agent, and he forwarded it to the first agent. The first
agent placed his sticker on the policy and retained part
of the commission. The Court held that the first agent
became the agent of the Defendant insurance company
and that the company was charged with the knowledge
of the facts of ownership which were acquired by this
first agent. Accordingly, it was held that the company
waived the defense in the policy of the Plaintiff not having fee title. The Court in that case cited the general law

12
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on the subject as stated at 3 Cooley on Insurance, pp.
2529,2530:
"If an insurance agent, to whom a request for insurance is made, procures all or part of such insurance, through other agents, from a company
not represented by him, and receives the policy
written by such company for delivery to the applicant, he will generally be regarded as the agent
of the company issuing the policy, especially if he
receives a part of the premium as commission.
The principle underlying this doctrine is that the
company issuing the policy ratifies the acts of the
first-named agent, and constitutes him its agent
for that transaction by accepting the application
and by issuing and delivering the policy to him
for further delivery to the applicant. Hence, it
follows that the company will be charged with
knowledge of any information imparted to the
agent at the time the insurance is written."

The above statement on the general law is certainly
in keeping with good public policy. Persons such as
Plaintiffs in the case at bar have no idea concerning the
machinations and exchanges going on between insurance
agents and companies. In this case, for instance, State
Auto assumed the policy for Guarantee Security Insurance Company. Then we find from State Auto
through its Denver manager that Kolob Corporation was
its general agent in 1964 and that Kolob had appointed
Diversified as a local agent. Then, on November 28,
1964, State Auto cancelled the appointment of Diversified as agent.
To further complicate the situation, it appears that

13
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not only did State Auto fail to notify Plaintiffs of the
cancellation, but that Diversified continued to service
the Plaintiffs under this insurance policy subsequent to
the purported termination. All plaintiffs knew was that
they were insured and that the agent had agreed that
they would receive notification of the expiration of the
policy in time to renew it.
The Court correctly instructed the jury in Instruction No. 15 as to the elements of proof which Plaintiffs
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence in
order to prevail. These are summarized as follows:
1. That prior to October 1, 1967, a custom existed

whereby agents writing fire insurance for Plaintiffs
would renew such insurance upon expiration of the term
of existing policy and bill Plaintiffs for the premiums
then owing without a specific request for such renewal
from Plaintiffs.
2. That prior to October 1, 1967, Diversified knew

of this custom through its employee, Salisbury, an<l
through him agreed with the Plaintiffs to service their
policy in accordance therewith.
3. That on or before October 1, 1967, Defendant

State Auto was either (a) then represented by Diversified as its agent, or (b) had failed to give Plaintiffs notice of its termination of Diversified as its agent.
4. That on or before October 1, 1967, State Auto,

or its agent, failed to renew the policy in accordance with
its custom or to give notice to Plaintiffs that it did not
intend to.

14
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5. That Plaintiffs in reasonable reliance upon such
custom were damaged as a consequence of such failure.

We submit that this instruction correctly submitted
the case to the jury in accordance with the prevailing
law. We submit that the Farrington case has established
the law in Utah to the effect that the knowledge of insurance agents is imputed to their principals. Futhermore, the principal is bound by courses of dealing existing between its agents and their insureds.
There was ample evidence to support the finding
of the jury in Plaintiffs' favor under Instruction No. 15.
As far as the law concerning custom and practice of
insurance companies is concerned, we cite the following
to the Court:
In the case of Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of California (1911) 38 Utah 532, 114 P. 134,
custom and practice became an issue, and the Court cited
2 Joyce on Insurance, Section 1356 as follows:
"If an insurance company or its authorized agent,
by its habits of business, or by its acts or declarations, or by a custom to receive overdue premiums
without objection, or by a custom not to exact
prompt payment of the same, or, in brief, by any
course of conduct, has induced, honest belief, in
the mind of the policyholder, which is reasonably
founded, that strict compliance with the stipulation for punctual payments of premiums will not
be insisted upon, but that the payment may b.e
treated without forfeiture resulting therefrom, it
will be deemed to have waived the right to claim

15
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forfeiture, or it will be estopped from enforcing
the same, although the policy expressly provides
for forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums as
stipulated, and even though it is also conditioned
that agents cannot waive forfeitures."
The Court cited with approval the statement of the
Loftis case in Ballard v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co.
( 1933) 82 Utah 1, 21 P. 2d 847. The general statement
of this principle is stated at 45 C.J.S. Insurance, par.
712,pp.679,680:
"An insurance company cannot insist on a forfeiture for failure to pay premiums in accordance
with the terms of the policy when its course of
dealing has been such as to induce the belief in
insured that strict compliance with such provisions
will not be insisted on, as where it has been its
custom to receive premiums or assessments after
they are due. The essence of such a waiver is a
course of conduct by insurer reasonably leading
insured to believe that lapse will not be exacted,
and to bring a case within this rule it must reasonably appear that insurer intended, tacitly or
otherwise, to waive the right it initially had to declare the policy forfeited, and that insured was
misled into acting on the honest belief that forfeiture would not be insisted upon for failure to
pay in compliance with the terms of the policy."
and again at p. 682:
"If it is the custom of the insurance company to
notify insured of the due dates of premiums, as
by having its agent bill him or call to collect the
same, its failure to do so may excuse prompt payment thereof. Such a custom has been held to

16
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override general policy provisions against waiver
by the agent, * * *"
See also National Fidelity Life Insurance Co. v. Henry
(Okla. 1935) 486 P.2d 829; Minnick v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance, 54 Del. 125, 174 A.2d 706; Kaeppel v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York (3d Cir.
1935) 78 F.2d 699, citing May on Insurance, Vol. 2, par.
356, (a):

"* * * where from

the course of dealing between
the parties the insured has a right to believe that
notice will be given to him of the amount due and
the time it is to be paid, the company cannot in
the absence of such notice set up the failure to
pay."
Also, see 43 Am. J ur. 2d, Insurance, par. 554, p. 571 :
"Indeed, it is said to be the prevailing rule that
where an insurer uniformly follows the practice
of giving notice of payments for such a time as
leads those insured to believe that notice will be
given, it cannot declare a forfeiture without notice, or without previously advising those who
have relied upon receiving notice that the custom
will be or has been discontinued."
Also, see Seavey v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 232, 69 N.W.2d
889.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE ON CUSTOM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
Defendant State Auto complains in Point III that
the testimony of William Slaugh on custom or usage was
17
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improper. The purpose in presenting the evidence of
Slaugh on custom and practice in the community of Vernal was not in any way an attempt to vary the terms of
an insurance contract. This we have not attempted to do.
The purpose for which this evidence was offered had to
do with the allegations of negligence as to the two Defendant agents involved in this lawsuit. The Second
Amended Complaint charged both Diversified and A-1
Agencies Diversified with negligence in failing to notify
the Plaintiffs of the expiration of the policy in question.
Accordingly, it became germane to the issue of negligence what the custom and practice of the agents in the
community was with regard to giving notice of expiration
to their clients. Mr. Slaugh had been an insurance agent
in the Vernal area for approximately 19 years. He testified that there was a uniform custom existing as to agents
notifying clients of expiration of policies and that
through his contact with the various other agents and
companies operating in the area that he was familiar with
this custom. He then testified that it was the custom to
give notice of expiration dates of policies and also to give
clients an opportunity to reinstate policies if necessary.
This evidence was entirely relevant to the issue of negligence and a more than adequate foundation was laid for
the witness testifying as to the custom and practice.
Compare the testimony admitted as to custom and
practice in the case of DeW eese v. J. C. Penney Co.
(1956) 5 U.2d 116, 297 P.2d 898, and Peterson v. Hansen-Niederhauser Inc. (1962) 13 U.2d 355, 374 P.2d
513. Also, see Brigham Young University v. Liillywhite
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(10th Cir., 1941) US F.2d 836; Erickson v. Walgreen
Drug Co. (1951) 120 U. 31, 232 P.2d 210, and W. T.
Grant Co. v. Karen (10th Cir., 1951) 190 F.2d 710.
POINT III.
THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT
APPLY IN THIS CASE.
A. STATE AUTO MAKES THIS OBJECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS
COURT.
No where in the record of this trial was an objection
made by Defendant State Auto or anyone else as to any
evidence being inadmissible on the ground of a violation
of the parole evidence rule. Defendant has waived the
right to make that objection in this Court.
B. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE NOT TRYING TO CHANGE THE CONTRACT.
The parole evidence rule does not apply in this case
for the reason that there was no evidence offered or recieved in any way attempting to vary the terms of an insurance policy. We are not trying to change the terms of
the insurance policy. However, we do say that when an
insurance company adopts a course of dealing of giving
notice and renewing policies to the extent that an insured comes to rely on this, the insurer has waived its
right to insist on a strict enforcement of the expiration
of the policy on the day of expiration. Accordingly,
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Plaintiffs have the right to expect notice of expiration
and to be billed for the premium. This right became
established by the course of dealing Plaintiffs had for
many years with Noble Kimball and which was adopted
by Diversified. State Auto, when it accepted the Policy
from Diversified and allowed Diversified to countersign its policy, adopted that custom and practice and became bound by it. Accordingly, State Auto was obligated
to renew the policy and should be held to its terms.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the case was submitted to the jury
on correct instructions. The authorities cited herein establish that insurance companies which adopt a custom
and practice of giving notice as to expiration dates and
renewing policies for customers, cannot insist on prompt
payment if they fail to live up to this custom. The evidence establishes that a course of dealing of long duration existed between Plaintiffs and Noble Kimball. The
evidence establishes that Diversified accepted and adopted this course of dealing. When Diversified placed this
policy with State Auto and counter-signed it, State Auto
adopted the course of dealing. State Auto cannot divest
itself of responsibility in this matter merely by telling us
that they cancelled their agency agreement with Diversified. It admits that it gave no notice of the cancellation to
Plaintiffs. The Court correctly instructed the jury that
the agency cannot be terminated as to Plaintiffs without
such notice.
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Accordingly, State Auto is bound, as it should be,
by the custom and practice of giving notice and automatically renewing insurance policies. We submit that
the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK of
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Respondents
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